The Devils in the Details: a Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain' by Wheeler, Michael
 75 
The Devils in the Details: a Response to 
Kiverstein’s ‘Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality 
and the Brain’ 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While remaining in broad agreement with the overall 
position developed and defended by Kiverstein, I identify and 
discuss what I take to be a number of problems with the details of 
the argument. These concern (a) the claim that a certain temporal 
structure to conscious experience is necessary for there to be a 
minimal sense of self, (b) the alleged ubiquitous presence in 
experience of a minimal sense of self, and (c) the claim that the 
distinction between the constitutive background conditions and the 
core realizer of a given experience is ultimately unsustainable. 
 
Michael Wheeler 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Stirling 
 
 
 
There is no doubt that Julian Kiverstein’s bold and incisive paper, ‘Minimal Sense 
of Self, Temporality and the Brain’ (this volume), makes important progress on the issue 
of how to understand the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Having said 
that – and notwithstanding my enthusiasm for, and my broad agreement with, the general 
character of the overall position – I want to ask questions of certain aspects of 
Kiverstein’s analysis. In my view there are a number of problems in the details of the 
package on offer, and later on in this commentary I shall try to explain what they are. 
Before that, however, we should recall the key moves in Kiverstein’s argument.  
 
Kiverstein follows Rosenthal (1990/1997) in drawing a distinction between state 
consciousness and creature consciousness. However, and crucially for his argument, 
Kiverstein develops his own take on the latter of these categories, a take according to 
which creature consciousness is what a creature has during those times when it has “its 
own subjective perspective on the world” (p.63).1 One dimension of this phenomenon is 
the first-person access that a creature with such a perspective has to its own conscious 
states. On Kiverstein’s account, it is a necessary condition for such first-person access 
that the states in question include, as an intrinsic property, a basic form of pre-conceptual 
and pre-linguistic self-consciousness. This property, following other thinkers with 
phenomenological leanings, he calls pre-reflective self-consciousness (p.63). Although 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to Kiverstein’s paper, ‘Minimal sense of self, temporality 
and the brain’.  
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pre-reflective self-consciousness comes in different modes (remembering, imagining, and 
so on), nevertheless all its modes share the property of being first-person in character, 
which means that the conscious states that are given to me in this way are necessarily 
given to me as mine. This pre-reflective ‘mine-ness’ requires only the immediate, 
noninferential awareness of the state as my own, and not the kind of reflective awareness 
in play on those occasions when I adopt the stance of an observer on my own mental life. 
  
What consequences does this understanding of creature consciousness have for 
our conception of the neural correlates of consciousness? Kiverstein follows Block 
(2007) in drawing a distinction between the core realizer and the total realizer of a 
particular experience of a certain kind. The core realizer is that part of a neural 
representational system that distinguishes one conscious content from another. The core 
realizer of a particular experience of a certain kind will be sufficient for that experience 
only in the context of wider neural activity. Thus the total realizer will include all the 
neural structures that make up the core realizer plus all the neural structures that realize 
the background conditions necessary for the core realizer to function as such. According 
to Block, a further distinction can be made, between causally necessary background 
conditions (such as cerebral blood flow) and constitutive background conditions (such as 
the activation of the upper brainstem). With this conceptual backdrop in place, Kiverstein 
identifies localists as being those cognitive theorists who (a) take the neural correlates of 
consciousness to be the core realizers of particular states of consciousness, and (b) take 
the neural correlates of creature consciousness to be part of the (causally necessary or 
constitutive) background conditions that must be in place for the brain to realize 
particular conscious experiences. In contrast, Kiverstein identifies holists as being those 
cognitive theorists who take the neural correlates of creature consciousness to be part of 
the core realizer of a particular conscious experience. On the holistic view, state and 
creature consciousness are conceived of in a way that rules out the possibility of 
investigating their neural basis separately.  
 
Kiverstein argues that his view of creature consciousness, as sketched above, 
mandates holism. Creature consciousness “consists in the possession of a minimal sense 
of self” (p.66), and a minimal sense of self is an intrinsic part of every conscious state. It 
follows that the neural basis of that minimal sense of self, and thus of creature 
consciousness, cannot be relegated to a mere causal background condition. This suggests 
that the neural correlates of creature consciousness ought at least to be counted as 
constitutive background conditions. But, Kiverstein argues, the distinction between the 
constitutive background conditions and the core realizer of a given experience is in fact 
unstable in the face of leading theories in the area that emphasize the interaction between 
these two phenomena. Kiverstein’s claim is that because of the necessity of this 
interaction, the so-called constitutive background conditions are “just as necessary for the 
occurrence of an experience with a particular content as the activity in the brain areas that 
constitute the core realizer” (p.68). If this is the case, however, we have no reason to 
resist the thought that the neural activity of creature consciousness is part of the core 
realizer of a given experience. That completes the argument for holism.  
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The final part of the Kiverstein jigsaw is the claim that for conscious states to 
include pre-reflective self-consciousness (a minimal sense of self), it is necessary that 
those states have an inherently temporal character – it is “how consciousness must of 
necessity be structured in order for conscious states to include pre-reflective self-
consciousness” (p.68). Drawing on phenomenological thought (specifically the work of 
Husserl as developed by Gallagher 2005), Kiverstein argues that each instance of our 
experience presents us with temporally extended objects – objects that are functions of 
the recent past, the present, and the near future. The experience of listening to a tune 
provides a nice example of this idea. Hearing a note as part of a tune requires that the 
previous notes in the melody are somehow present in the current moment, and that the 
future notes are somehow anticipated. Given this temporal structure, we can think more 
precisely about what we retain in each moment of experience and  about what we 
anticipate.  According to Kiverstein, from moment to moment the entire (past-present-
future) temporal character of the previous phase of experience is retained. Significantly, 
this indicates that “I will, from moment to moment, be simultaneously aware both of 
what my experiences present but also of my ongoing experience” (p.69). In addition, I 
anticipate not merely “what is about to happen, but what is about to happen to me” 
(p.69). It is here that, according to Kiverstein, we see the necessity of the temporal 
structure of experience for the minimal sense of self. The full picture is now in place. 
Creature consciousness intrinsically involves a minimal sense of self. That minimal sense 
of self is part of every experience. Thus, the neural processes responsible for creature 
consciousness are part of the core realizer of every particular conscious experience.  
Since the minimal sense of self is, at least in part, a consequence of the complex temporal 
structure of experience, any theory of the neural correlates of particular conscious 
experiences must explain the neural basis of experiences with a complex temporal 
structure.  
  
This is a powerful and attractive story. So where are the aforementioned 
problems? Let’s start with the claim that the temporal character of conscious experience, 
as described by Kiverstein, is necessary for there to be a minimal sense of self. It seems 
to me that not quite enough has been said to substantiate this claim. The idea that, as far 
as I can tell, is driving Kiverstein here, is the phenomenological observation that the past 
and future dimensions of present experience – its retentional and anticipatory 
(protentional) aspects – involve what Gallagher, in Husserlian mode, characterizes as a 
double intentionality. Thus: “[my] experience of the passage of a melody is at the same 
time a non-observational, pre-reflective awareness of my own flowing experience” 
(Gallagher 2005: p.193). This seems right. However, what precisely does it show? 
Consider the plausible claim, made by Gallagher and endorsed in the following words by 
Kiverstein, that “if someone were to be deprived of [protention] they would feel like all 
of their conscious states as they unfolded in the future were imposed on them from the 
outside” (p.69). Why is this? Because protention is not just a pre-reflective impression of 
what will happen, but also a pre-reflective impression of what will happen to me. In other 
words, what explains the phenomenon identified by Gallagher is that the protentional 
aspect of the temporal structure of experience intrinsically involves Kiverstein’s minimal 
sense of self. Under these circumstances, it doesn’t seem right for Kiverstein to say that 
protention is necessary for a minimal sense of self. Protention can only be distinguished 
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from a mere impression of what will happen because, as a phenomenon, it already 
involves that very sense. I think that a similar point could be made about retention. 
Having made these remarks, I hasten to add that even if they are right, they do not on 
their own undermine Kiverstein’s specific conclusion in this area, namely that in order to 
explain the neural correlates of particular conscious experiences we must explain the 
neural basis of experiences with a complex temporal structure.         
 
Let’s turn now to the alleged ubiquitous presence in experience of the minimal 
sense of self. Kiverstein holds that creature consciousness is to be identified with pre-
reflective self-consciousness and that all pre-reflective conscious states are characterized 
by a minimal sense of self. Thus he says that “prior to reflection my conscious states are 
always already given as mine” (p.65, my emphasis) and (as we have seen) that “creature 
consciousness consists in the possession of a minimal sense of self” (p.66, my emphasis). 
However, there is a subtly different claim in the vicinity here with which Kiverstein 
occasionally seems to flirt, namely the claim that creature consciousness is to be 
identified with the capacity for enjoying pre-reflectively self-conscious states 
characterized by a minimal sense of self. Kiverstein seems to endorse this second view 
when he claims that a “creature is conscious when it can undergo states of mind that have 
first-person givenness and therefore include a minimal sense of self” (p.65, my 
emphasis). The importance of this distinction is that the former claim excludes the 
possibility that creature consciousness may be manifested as pre-reflectively conscious 
states that do not include a minimal sense of self, whereas the latter claim allows for such 
a situation, just so long as the creature in question has the capacity to undergo other pre-
reflective conscious states that do include a minimal sense of self.  
 
The choice between these options comes to the fore in Kiverstein’s reply to the 
objection that not all the conscious states of a creature need involve that creature having 
“a sense of himself as being in some way affected by these states” (p.64). Kiverstein 
responds to this complaint by concentrating on the case of a proprioceptive experience in 
which I form the thought that I am raising my arm on the basis of a feeling of my arm 
raising. He observes that this thought is immune to errors of misidentification, and 
explains this fact by way of the first-person givenness of my experience of raising my 
arm. This first-person givenness pre-empts the need for any act of identification, and 
thereby blocks the possibility of misidentification. Now, as far as I can tell, this analysis 
may be right for experiences that have the form of the thought that Kiverstein describes. 
Of course, the objection does not claim that conscious states like that – states whose 
surface phenomenological description already mentions “I” and “my” – do not involve a 
minimal sense of self. It claims that there exist conscious states that do not involve a 
minimal sense of self. Another way to put this point is to note that Kiverstein’s reply 
would be decisive against his critic only if the tabled objection was that no conscious 
states ever involve a minimal sense of self. The objection, however, is less strident, and 
correlatively more plausible. Consistent with the capacity-oriented claim about creature 
consciousness mentioned above, the present critic can allow for the existence of pre-
reflectively self-conscious states that feature a minimal sense of self. And, as mentioned 
already, the arm-raising experience discussed by Kiverstein may well be one such case. 
What the present critic denies, however, is that all conscious states are like that. Because 
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Kiverstein holds that creature consciousness is to be identified with pre-reflective self-
consciousness and that all pre-reflective conscious states are characterized by a minimal 
sense of self, his account cannot make room for such states.   
 
So can we find any examples of conscious states that do not involve a minimal 
sense of self? If we can, then creature consciousness cannot consist in the possession of a 
minimal sense of self. Here is an analysis that answers in the positive, and which betrays 
my own phenomenological heritage. The Heideggerian in me denies that pre-reflective 
consciousness is always subject-object in form, a denial that sets me against Kiverstein’s 
claim that creature consciousness is what a creature has during those times when it has its 
own subjective perspective on the world. To explain: Heidegger argues that smooth 
coping (hitch-free skilled activity) involves a form of awareness in which the contrast 
between subject and object plays no part. This notion of awareness, which Heidegger 
calls circumspection, is identified in the following remark: “When we enter here through 
the door, we do not apprehend the seats, and the same holds for the doorknob. 
Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, avoid 
them circumspectly... and the like” (Heidegger 1927/1982: p.163). The idea here is that 
the human agent has no conscious recognition of either the doorknob that it turns or of 
the seats around which it walks as objects, that is, as independent things with determinate 
properties. Similarly, to use Heidegger's most famous example, while engaged in hitch-
free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the 
workbench as independent objects (Heidegger 1927/1962: pp.98-99). During smooth 
coping, then, the carpenter’s equipment is a transparent feature of his phenomenal 
experience, which means that the object-concept is inappropriate for describing that 
experience. 
 This is only half the Heideggerian story, however, and where the analysis 
becomes acutely relevant to our present concerns. Heidegger's complementary claim is 
that during, for example, skilled carpentry, not only are the hammer, nails, and 
workbench not part of the carpenter's phenomenal world, neither, in a sense, is the 
carpenter. The carpenter becomes absorbed in her activity in such a way that she has no 
awareness of herself as a subject over and against a world of objects. So, in the domain of 
smooth coping, there are, phenomenologically speaking, no subjects and no objects; there 
is only the subject-less experience of the ongoing task. What this suggests is that there are 
some examples of conscious arm-moving, which involve an awareness that cannot be 
given the Kiverstein treatment. In other words, the pivotal claim that every pre-reflective 
conscious state is characterized by a minimal sense of self is false. Kiverstein’s most 
natural reply here would be to claim that the Heideggerian analysis should be understood 
as denying the phenomenological presence in smooth coping of a maximal rather than a 
minimal sense of self. If all Heidegger is claiming is that smooth copers are not 
reflectively self-conscious, then, of course Kiverstein and he are not at odds.  I think, 
however, that Heidegger must have both senses of self in his sights, since he explicitly 
distinguishes the subject-less (and object-less) flow of smooth coping from cases in 
which, due to (for example) disturbances in skilled activity, what we might think of as 
proto-subjects (and proto-objects) emerge out of that flow (for discussion, see Wheeler 
2005: pp.138-144). If minimal selves appear anywhere in Heidegger’s phenomenological 
framework, they appear as the proto-subjects present in these sorts of disruptions.  
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Another example of pre-reflective consciousness that, to me anyway, seems to be 
devoid of any minimal sense of self, is to be found in some examples of spontaneous 
crowd consciousness. Two days ago in the Edinburgh derby, after only ninety seconds of 
football, Hibernian took the lead at Easter Road against Hearts. The crowd (well, most of 
it anyway) exploded as one joyous unity. At that moment, was my conscious experience 
characterized by a minimal sense of self? I don’t think so. The ephemeral public mood of 
celebratory elation that characterized the pre-reflective experience of that moment seems 
to have been exhaustive of the experience. Of course, from the perspective of a certain 
kind of analysis (e.g. the location of the relevant neural states in my brain), there may 
well have been an experience there that was identifiable as mine, but that is not enough 
for Kiverstein’s purpose. Kiverstein needs the minimal sense of self to be an aspect of the 
phenomenological character of the experience, not merely a hidden feature of its 
underlying neural structure.   Notice that neither this example of the absent minimal sense 
of self, nor the preceding one, may be undermined by the thought that they fail to explain 
immunity to errors of misidentification. Both experiences achieve such immunity on the 
grounds that, within them, there is no identification of the experience with any individual 
subject, so there certainly cannot be errors of misidentification. The possibility of such 
error is pre-empted, although in a way different from that exhibited by Kiverstein’s arm-
raising example. Indeed, in order to make conceptual space for such an identification – 
one that might conceivably go wrong – we are forced to impose a subject-object structure 
on the experience in question. In so doing, we misrepresent the fundamental nature of 
that experience as it happened at the time. In the end, then, Kiverstein’s claim that 
creature consciousness is to be identified with a minimal sense of self is, I think, open to 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Finally I shall turn to a worry that remains, even if the bridge from creature 
consciousness to a minimal sense of self can be repaired. A key part of Kiverstein’s case 
for holism is the claim that the localist-friendly distinction between the constitutive 
background conditions and the core realizer of a given experience is unsustainable. The 
argument here is that because of the necessity of interaction between these phenomena, 
the so-called constitutive background conditions, which include the neural correlates of 
creature consciousness, are “just as necessary for the occurrence of an experience with a 
particular content as the activity in the brain areas that constitute the core realizer” (p.68). 
As it stands, this argument is too quick. For even in the face of interactions between these 
phenomena, what would preserve their separability would be an identifiable difference in 
functional contribution. Interestingly, Kiverstein himself suggests that just such a 
difference may exist. He argues that the neural correlates of creature consciousness may 
well coincide with the neural correlates that explain the difference between conscious and 
nonconscious processing of a stimulus (p.67). If this is right, then those neural states and 
processes explain something that may remain the same across variations in the contents 
of consciousness (pp.66-67). By contrast, the neural correlates of the core realizer will be 
those that explain such variations. This functional difference seems to me sufficient to 
maintain the distinction between constitutive background conditions and the core realizer. 
So even if creature consciousness is, in some way, part of every conscious state, there is 
no good reason yet to think of it as anything more than a constitutive background 
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condition. Under these circumstances, and pace Kiverstein, localism does not necessarily 
collapse into holism.      
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